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Abstract: T. D. Kieu has claimed that a quantum computing procedure 
can solve a classically unsolvable problem. Recent work of W. D. Smith 
has shown that Kieu’s central mathematical claim cannot be sustained. 
Here, a more general critique is given of Kieu’s proposal and some 
suggestions are made regarding the Church-Turing thesis.
0. Introduction: In 2001 the physicist Tien D. Kieu announced that a 
quantum computing procedure could solve a classically unsolvable 
problem, namely Hilbert’s Tenth Problem. This problem, that of deciding 
whether a polynomial integer-valued function of integers ever vanishes, is 
essentially equivalent to the standard ‘halting problem’ and other such 
unsolvable problems as defined by Turing machines. (The classic 
exposition of this fascinating connection is by Martin Davis (1958, 
1982)). Kieu has since produced a number of publications with 
overlapping material. Reference will be made in what follows to some of 
the arXiv versions of his exposition. But it should be noted that his work 
has also been accepted and published in leading journals.
Kieu’s claim is closely connected with the recent programme of so-called 
‘hypercomputation’ as laid out by Copeland, Stannett, Ord, Calude and 
others (for a recent review see (Stannett 2004)). According to this view, 
as expounded in Scientific American by the philosophers Copeland and 
Proudfoot (1999), the computing of classically uncomputable functions 
(‘hypercomputing’) may be a matter of finding the right technology to 
make it possible. Indeed these authors enthusiastically announced the 
search for such technology to be already under way. Kieu’s proposal 
emerged as perhaps the brightest hope for fulfilling this dream. It is also 
the strongest claim made for power of quantum computation. These 
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questions are frequently expressed in terms of the Church-Turing thesis, 
but for reasons that will become clear, we are postponing a discussion of 
this topic to §8 below. 
Kieu’s proposal is essentially a brute-force search, in which the 
polynomial is evaluated for all possible arguments and the results scanned 
for a zero. Clearly, a search using classical computation would never 
decide in a finite time that a polynomial was non-vanishing. The idea is 
that quantum computation enables an essential speed-up, making a 
decision in finite time possible, because all the computations can be done 
in parallel, using the superposition of states in quantum mechanics. 
However, Kieu does not use standard quantum computation, based on 
‘qubits’ and elementary ‘gate’ operations, but the ‘adiabatic cooling’ 
method due to Farhi et al. (2000). For finite searches this method yields 
the same quadratic speed-up as the standard qubit-based method due to 
Grover (1996). Kieu’s claim is that for the infinite search required in the 
Hilbert problem, the speed-up can actually turn an infinite time into a 
finite time. This is of course a surprising claim, as it is stronger than an 
exponential speed-up. The central idea is quite ingenious: the polynomial 
itself is used to define a Hamiltonian for the dynamical quantum process, 
and the claim is that this yields the required speed-up. The adiabatic 
method is claimed to work by detecting (through a complicated 
procedure involving quantum measurement) the least value achieved by 
the square of the polynomial. One then sees whether or not it is zero.
There are some gaps in explaining exactly what the procedure is, and 
serious problems with the mathematical analysis of the physical system in 
Kieu’s work. Conjectures rather than proofs are given, especially in 
connection with the properties of infinite-dimensional Hilbert spaces. The 
central point is that Kieu’s procedure depends on the truth of a result 
which is very much stronger than the adiabatic theorem. This result is not 
proved by Kieu, and Warren D. Smith has found counter-examples which 
disprove it. This paper will not discuss these more technical problems, for 
which the reader is referred to Smith (2005).  It surveys some of the 
general questions raised by Kieu’s scheme that would still be problematic 
even if the mathematical argument could be in some way rectified.  It is 
based on an earlier, preliminary note (Hodges 2004).  
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There are quite a number of such general questions to discuss, because 
Kieu’s papers are not limited to describing this quantum procedure. They 
also offer further reasons for why, in his opinion, this procedure outdoes 
classical computation. 
1. Randomness and computability.  Important in the theoretical 
background is Kieu’s assertion (Kieu 2003d, p. 18) that the randomness in 
his scheme takes it out of the arena of classical computability and its 
limitations. 
A random real number is (with probability 1) uncomputable — as follows 
from simple cardinality arguments. Some proponents of ‘hyper-
computation’ consider this is a key fact leading towards their goal. Yet 
intuitively, it seems implausible that by making some elements in a 
process random rather than deterministic, we would increase the power 
of that process. As Ord (2002) puts it, can this uncomputability be 
harnessed in any way? This question was addressed by Shannon et al. 
(1956). Their conclusions can be summarised thus: introducing a random 
element producing equiprobable outputs of 0 and 1 will, indeed, do no 
better than a deterministic Turing machine. If the probability is not 1/2 
but some other computable parameter, the situation is the same. If the 
probability is λ, some uncomputable real number, then that number λ can 
be computed; in other words, computation is indeed strictly extended to 
become computation relative to λ. Kieu (2003d) suggests that this 
extension is the fundamental reason why his procedure is effective. 
However, it must be noted that the randomness in the output can do no 
better than copying the uncomputable number that has already been put 
into the random element. It does not create anything uncomputable. We 
shall return to this point at the end of §4.
It is not just that Kieu has randomness in the procedure; there is also 
randomness in the decision effected by the procedure. The answer is only 
asserted to be correct with some probability. Kieu calls this a ‘stochastic’ 
version of the decision problem. It could be objected that such a 
‘stochastic’ solution is not a solution at all: Hilbert calls for a decision, 
not a guess! Kieu (2004) quotes Turing on how the classical arguments of 
undecidability do not apply if ‘mistakes’ are allowed, and the word 
‘mistakes’ should sound a warning, since the essence of the decision 
problem as originally posed is that we should be guaranteed a correct 
-3-
answer. One natural demand on any ‘stochastic’ version of the decision 
procedure, for it to count as a candidate for serious consideration, is that 
it should satisfy a strict uniformity constraint. For any ε >0, there should 
be a specified procedure P(ε) which can be applied to any polynomial, and 
will give the right answer with probability 1 – ε.  Kieu’s scheme does 
appear to cater for such uniformity, although it is not explicitly stated as 
an essential criterion. However, it may be objected that this still does not 
match the certainty of a classical decision procedure.
2. Randomness in quantum mechanics. There are two essentially 
different fundamental processes in quantum mechanics. One is the 
unitary evolution of a wave-function in configuration space. This is 
deterministic, governed by the Schrödinger equation with a particular 
Hamiltonian, and produces complex-valued amplitudes. The second is the 
reduction or measurement process which ‘collapses’ the wave function to 
an eigenstate of the measurement operator. This is where randomness 
enters: the probability of collapsing to any particular eigenstate is given 
by the squared modulus of the corresponding component of the 
amplitude. 
The ‘Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle’ is often referred to as basic to 
quantum mechanics, but it is better considered as derived from these 
more fundamental processes. This has the effect of locating the 
randomness more clearly and such clarity is important because, in Kieu’s 
theory, randomness is supposed to be the source of the power of the 
method. 
Randomness plays a role in Kieu’s theory because the procedure requires 
detecting when a particular property is satisfied by the quantum 
amplitude. But the amplitudes cannot be inspected directly; they can only 
be probed by measurements which collapse the wave-function and so 
introduce randomness. Kieu’s idea turns on estimating the property of the 
amplitude by doing such measurements repeatedly, then using standard 
statistical theory to estimate the property of the amplitude to any 
required degree of certainty. Smith (2005) comments that this statistical 
analysis is not actually given by Kieu, but that it can be supplied. However, 
to achieve complete certainty we would need an infinite sample, which 
would take an infinite time, thus rendering the whole exercise futile. As 
mentioned above, it could be argued that this point alone renders the 
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scheme invalid: there seems no reason why this infinite time should be 
considered any less problematic than the infinite time needed in classical 
computing.
3. The computability of standard quantum computing. The basic 
idea of standard quantum computing is that a sequence of unitary 
operations is applied to an initial quantum state which contains the input 
data. Only at the end is a reduction or measurement process applied and 
the output read. The unitary evolution is itself deterministic and therefore 
could in principle be simulated by a classical computer. The point is that 
this classical simulation may be essentially slower, so that quantum 
computing can improve on the complexity of the classical procedure. But 
this argument indicates that quantum computing cannot produce 
classically uncomputable results.
How then does Kieu explain the allegedly superior power of his method? 
Kieu (2003a, p. 9, and again in 2003c p. 27) states that his procedure 
does better than standard quantum computing with qubits. And he gives 
the reason for this superiority: it lies in the infinite dimensionality of the 
Hilbert spaces he uses, as opposed to the finite dimensionality of standard 
quantum computing. He does not emphasise that this means that he is 
charging a simple and finite physical system (a harmonic oscillator) with 
an infinite amount of data. But this is a fundamental point: the basis of 
Kieu’s claim is that an infinite amount of information can be compressed 
into a finite physical system. 
Possibly, the contrast with standard quantum computing is obscured by 
the way a ‘qubit’ is described in standard accounts. A ‘qubit’ is generally 
said to be a particular and exact superposition of 
€ 
0  and 
€ 
1  states, i.e. a 
particular ray in the complex projective space of states. It might appear 
therefore that a qubit needs infinite precision in its specification. Indeed 
Kieu (2003b, p.3) seems to imply this when he asserts that real numbers, 
as opposed to integers, are needed to define quantum states. But this 
overlooks the fact that the properties of quantum computing are always 
discussed relative to bounded error. Error and the sophisticated control 
of error are central elements in the development of quantum computing 
theory. In contrast, Kieu’s infinite data storage needs zero error to work, 
and really does depend on setting up and maintaining an infinitely precise 
system.
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4. Infinite precision. The basic difficulty here is not essentially 
quantum-mechanical. It arises in just the same way if we consider 
encoding an infinite amount of data into a real-valued continuous curve 
on [0,1] through Fourier decomposition. One may imagine a wave on a 
string with unboundedly high harmonics, with the amplitude of the N th 
harmonic encoding the N th piece of data. Unboundedly high harmonics 
correspond to unboundedly short wavelengths, so that detecting every 
harmonic requires infinite precision. Measurement apparatus incapable of 
a resolution better than wavelength 1/N, will be deaf to harmonics higher 
than the N th, and lose all the data after the N th piece.
The quantum harmonic oscillator employed in Kieu’s scheme has Hermite 
eigenstates whose wave-functions are are not essentially different in this 
respect from the sinusoidal functions of elementary Fourier analysis. The 
Nth wave-function consists of N peaks and troughs packed into the 
characteristic length L of the oscillator. The ability to compress 
unboundedly many such peaks into a finite length L is essential to Kieu’s 
procedure.
The diophantine equations we are considering are equations in many 
integer variables, so the search is actually a search for a vector of several 
integers rather than for one integer, but this makes no essential 
difference to the point being made here, and for brevity we will refer in 
what follows to single integer arguments. We now consider what is 
involved in simulating the Kieu process on a classical computer. Normally, 
one would appeal to the idea of getting a better and better approximation 
in the simulation of the Schrödinger equation by taking shorter and 
shorter step-lengths. But this is not a ‘normal’ process. There is no prior 
knowledge of where the least value of the polynomial will occur: the 
process must involve all  integer values. But taking a step-length of 1/N is, 
roughly, equivalent to computing the polynomial only up to N. This is no 
approximation at all to solving Hilbert’s Tenth Problem, and anyway is 
obviously no better than what could be done much more simply by 
computing the polynomial. Thus, infinite precision is crucial.
Here are two more illustrations of why infinite precision is essential to 
Kieu’s procedure.
(1) The initial step in the procedure consists of mapping the polynomial 
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into a physical Hamiltonian. But whilst the polynomial is defined on the 
integers, the Hamiltonian (with the dimensions of energy) must take 
values in the (real) continuum. (Indeed it is essential to the adiabatic 
method that it is multiplied by a continuously varying real time 
parameter.) As a concrete example, take the equation 
€ 
2M 2 − N 2 = 0. This 
obviously has no solution since 
€ 
2  is irrational. According to Kieu, the 
quantum procedure will reveal this fact — not by the elegant argument 
known to the ancient Greeks, but by the infinite brute force evaluation of 
€ 
2M 2 − N 2( )2for all integers, and finding that its least value is 1. The first 
step is to encode this function as a Hamiltonian, but this means 
translating the 2 as 2.00000... and the 1 by 1.00000...  The slightest error 
in this transcription will (for sufficiently large values of 
€ 
M  and 
€ 
N ) 
completely wreck the calculation of the polynomial and invalidate the 
search for its minimum value.
(2) The procedure requires application of the ‘number operator’ as a 
measurement process. In the usual formalism of quantum mechanics this 
operator is written as a+a and gives the impression that everything takes 
place in an integer-valued algebraic setting. However, the fact is that the 
number operator is none other than:
€ 
−L2 ∂
2
∂x 2
+
x 2
L2
where L is the characteristic length (a real-valued constant) of the 
oscillator. Applying it requires knowledge of the characteristic length L to 
infinite precision. 
Kieu is aware of the unboundedly short wavelengths which prevent 
simulation by classical computation. But Kieu (2003d, p.5) asserts that 
‘the probabilistic nature of the method’ is manifested in this 
phenomenon. If this means anything, it is a claim that the errors involved 
in using numerical computation with non-zero step-lengths can be 
considered as random errors, to be identified with the randomness which 
is the alleged source of uncomputable output. This is unjustifiable. (1) 
There is no reason whatever why errors due to an approximate classical 
computation should produce miraculous effects outdoing classical 
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computation. (2) As we noted, randomness appears in quantum 
mechanics only at the reduction stage, not during the unitary evolution 
stage which is being simulated by the computation.
It is worth looking again at the theorem of Shannon et al. at this point. It 
shows that uncomputable results will not result from the measurement 
process unless the values of the quantum amplitudes are uncomputable. 
(This condition again illustrates the necessity for infinite precision in the 
physical process, since for a real number to be uncomputable it must be 
specified with infinite precision). But the amplitudes arise completely 
deterministically from the initial conditions. Thus quantum-mechanical 
randomness cannot in itself be the source of any ‘hypercomputing’ power. 
This confirms that it is not the randomness but the infinite precision 
which is the source of any power there is in Kieu’s scheme. In fact, Kieu’s 
identification of randomness as the source of ‘hypercomputing’ power 
seems to be entirely spurious.
5. Accelerated machines and unboundedly small time-steps. With 
an elementary use of geometric progressions, it is easy to show that 
unsolvable problems can be solved in a finite time by Turing machines, 
provided their steps can be made of unboundedly short time-length. This 
condition is, of course, completely unphysical, but there is some 
mathematical interest in the definition of such ‘accelerated Turing 
machines’ (and indeed no less a figure than Hermann Weyl started this 
line of thought). Even more interesting, the work of W. D. Smith shows 
how such infinite miniaturisation in space and time can be derived from 
actual equations of physical interest, e.g. the Navier-Stokes equations for 
hydrodynamics (Smith 2003), provided these equations are taken as valid 
at all scales. (Obviously, this condition is quite unphysical, but the results 
still hold great interest). Kieu’s use of unboundedly short wavelengths 
might perhaps be considered as playing a role similar to Smith’s 
conditions. For this reason his analysis, if it can be corrected, may have 
useful content as a mathematical exploration of different kinds of 
computational process. Indeed W. D. Smith (2005) has demonstrated 
some results arising from such an investigation.
However, the unboundedly high frequencies required for Kieu’s scheme, 
being equivalent to unboundedly short time-steps, mean that a final ‘finite 
time’ cannot be compared with the finite time taken by a classical Turing 
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machine. For if there is no smallest unit of time, a ‘finite’ time cannot be 
compared with the finite number of unit steps taken by a Turing machine 
coming to a conclusion. Equivalently, if a Turing machine is allowed to 
have unboundedly fast steps then it too can also ‘solve’ unsolvable 
problems in a finite time.
6. The nature of mathematical modelling. The foregoing 
observations suggest a more general point about the mathematical 
modelling of physical systems, which is not limited to quantum 
mechanics, but would apply to other putative physical schemes claiming 
to produce classically uncomputable results. First note that if a real 
number is used to represent a physical magnitude, as is normally the case, 
the digits of its decimal expansion obviously decline in significance 
throughout the infinite sequence. But if it is the computability of a real 
number that is the subject of attention, the situation is the reverse: any 
finite number of digits may be changed without affecting its status, and it 
is always the infinite tail of remaining digits that holds the information. 
When studying a physical system, analogous considerations obtain. 
Normally, in the mathematical model of a system, perfection is not 
essential. Let us take, for instance, the hydrogen atom. It was a 
tremendous achievement of quantum mechanics to explain its spectral 
lines by the non-relativistic Schrödinger equation. This explanation 
remains worthwhile even though a more accurate relativistic equation 
should be used. This in turn is inadequate to explain the phenomena of 
full relativistic quantum field theory (e.g. the Lamb shift), and this again is 
known to be inadequate because of its neglect of curved space-time. In a 
complete theory (which we do not possess) it would be necessary to take 
into account the complete geometry of the universe to give a precise 
calculation. But the simpler models still have great value: we know that 
their physical predictions are reasonably robust against the modifications 
induced by more accurate theories. The situation is entirely different with 
a scheme such as Kieu’s where total perfection of the model is required 
from the outset. Our usual assumptions about what is significant are 
turned upside-down. Indeed it is really not valid to use the normal 
language of ‘models’ in mathematical physics when setting out a scheme 
such as Kieu’s. For such normal language involves assumptions about 
robustness under small changes and perturbations, and these assumptions 
are completely invalid when applied to a scheme demanding infinite 
precision. 
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Kieu actually brings in the idea of a small perturbation into his scheme, 
and it is instructive to see how it illustrates this general point. He 
introduces it because of a technical difficulty. This is that in general, the 
least value of the polynomial being considered will not occur for a unique 
argument. For instance, the example given above will yield a minimum 
value of 1 at (2,3), (5,7), (12, 17) and infinitely many more values. This 
degeneracy affects the adiabatic theory and means that the system will 
not evolve into a suitable state for the scheme to work. Kieu’s answer 
(Kieu 2003d, p. 4) is to apply a small perturbation to the system which 
will separate the eigenstates. He cites this as a familar technique in 
quantum chemistry for resolving degenerate energy levels. But in 
quantum chemistry, energy levels with unboundedly large values do not 
play a crucial role, and the concept of ‘small’ perturbation makes sense. 
In Kieu’s scheme the ‘small’ perturbation parameter will still give 
unboundedly large perturbations when applied to the unboundedly large 
energy states which are crucial to the method. It may be that 
reformulation and correction of Kieu’s argument may eliminate the 
‘degeneracy’ problem, and so it may not in itself be a fatal flaw. But Kieu’s 
treatment of it illustrates how this author has not seriously considered 
how an infinitely precise model must be treated quite differently from one 
in normal applied mathematics. 
7. Contrast with Penrose’s argument: How does Kieu’s theory 
compare with the speculative theory of Penrose (1989, 1994) that there 
are uncomputable effects in quantum mechanics? It is completely 
different. Again, it is important to distinguish the roles of the unitary 
evolution and the reduction/measurement/collapse parts of quantum 
mechanics. Penrose suggests that there is a hidden structure to the latter: 
that reduction is not actually random but rests on some quite unknown 
dynamical principle which involves uncomputability. Penrose is not 
applying the rules of quantum mechanics as presently understood, but 
proposing that they must be superseded by new ones with greater 
content. These unknown laws might be quite different from differential 
equations, possibly involving boundary conditions of some quite new 
type. They might involve the non-locality of wave-functions in an essential 
way, and might not even be expressible in terms of space and time, 
requiring a deeper geometrical setting such as twistor space. Since we 
have little idea of what these laws might be, questions of precision and 
approximation cannot even be framed.
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Another difference is this: if Kieu were right, then one could (in principle) 
build a quantum processor that would act as an oracle for all polynomials: 
one could type in a polynomial equivalent to asking for the truth of the 
Fermat-Wiles theorem, or the Riemann hypothesis, and in a finite time 
obtain the (probably) correct answer. Penrose does not propose any such 
thing, and indeed emphasises that the uncomputability involved in his 
theory must be something ‘completely different’ from such an oracle.
8. Connection with the Church-Turing thesis: The interest of this 
topic arises because of its theoretical relationship with the bounds on 
classical Turing computability. The significance of these bounds is often 
referred to in terms of the ‘Church-Turing thesis’, and so there is much 
argument about what Kieu’s proposal has to say about the truth or 
otherwise of this thesis. Unfortunately, there is no unanimity regarding 
what the Church-Turing thesis actually asserts. The philosophers Copeland 
and Proudfoot (1999) insist that Church and Turing only discussed the 
calculations undertaken by a human being applying some rule, and said 
nothing at all about physical machines. In contrast, the computer scientist 
Andrew Chi-Chih Yao (2003) takes it to refer to ‘any conceivable 
hardware system’ effecting a calculation, commenting that this ‘may not 
have been what Church and Turing believed,’ but that it represents a 
commonly accepted view. Because of this uncertainty in definition, some 
writers distinguish a ‘physical’ Church-Turing thesis as opposed to a 
Church-Turing thesis confined to mathematical logic. 
In fact, Copeland and Proudfoot are mistaken, for Church (1937) 
explicitly characterised computable numbers as those which could be 
calculated by ‘a computing machine, occupying a finite space and with 
working parts if finite size’, referring to ‘a human calculator’ only as a 
particular example of such a machine. Turing likewise wrote freely of 
‘machines’ without making the distinction claimed as all-important by 
Copeland and Proudfoot. Thus Yao better represents Church and Turing’s 
general thrust, but his definition is rather too loose, as it lacks the 
finiteness condition carefully imposed by Church. Such a condition is 
necessary: one could ‘conceive of’ an infinite register, embodied in an 
infinite universe, set up as an infinite crib-sheet which could be trivially 
read off to ‘solve’ Hilbert’s Tenth Problem.
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Naturally, these remarks on history and conventional definitions make no 
difference to the actual science and mathematics of a scheme such as 
Kieu’s. But we should certainly take due note of the original expression 
‘effective calculability’ used for the concept that Turing elucidated with 
his Turing machine definition. ‘Effective’ means something that can 
actually be done. If a ‘broad’ concept of calculation is adopted which 
allows anything that can be merely postulated, then anything is calculable. 
(To compute X, postulate a machine with the property of printing X). The 
role of infinite quantities is crucial here. Waiting for an infinite time is not 
counted as effective. An infinite register of data must be ruled out 
likewise. An ‘accelerated Turing machine’ eliminates infinite time, but at 
the cost of demanding unboundedly short time-steps. Given the 
breakdown of space-time structure below the level of the Planck time, 
requiring such unboundedly short times would appear to be as ineffective 
as an infinite waiting time. Likewise an infinite data store can be 
compressed into a finite space at the cost of requiring an unboundedly 
precise measurement, something equally ineffective. A particularly trivial 
example of the latter trade-off, relying on measuring ‘an amount of 
electricity’ to infinite precision, is advanced by Copeland and Proudfoot 
(1999) as a model of how the hypercomputer revolution may take off. 
Another important finiteness property of Turing machines is that only a 
finite number of squares is used in the course of a calculation. But Kieu’s 
procedure requires an infinite number of quantum states to be used, 
moreover with unbounded speeds. 
Rather than take a dogmatic view of the Church-Turing thesis, it is 
probably better to expect it to evolve in conjunction with our better 
understanding of physical law, with Church’s finiteness conditions refined 
so as to apply in contexts where the classical concepts of ‘size’ and ‘parts’ 
are inadequate. Meanwhile, if proponents of ‘hypercomputing’ schemes 
wish to argue that unbounded speeds of operation, unboundedly small 
components, infinitely many working states or other such properties 
should be counted as ‘effective’ aspects of procedures, then their 
argument should be made explicit, rather than buried in the formalism, 
and some indication should be given of how these infinitudes could be 
physically realized. 
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9. Conclusion: Can quantum computing solve classically unsolvable 
problems? The general considerations above indicate that nothing like 
Kieu’s scheme will constitute an effective calculation. But Kieu’s proposal 
does have mathematical interest and may well help to stimulate new work. 
It draws attention to quantum mechanical procedures, neglected by 
logicians such as Gandy and Sieg. (Indeed the logicians’ restricted 
framework does not even allow for procedures using quantum 
entanglement, such as are already being used in quantum cryptography.) 
In particular, Kieu draws attention to the ‘adiabatic cooling’ method in 
which there are no discrete ‘steps’ of calculation. This again illustrates 
how existing analyses of ‘machines’ are over-restrictive. (It is worth 
noting that Church (1937) did not actually mention discrete steps, 
although logicians generally assume that ‘effective’ necessitates a finite 
number of operations). Thus Kieu’s flawed work may be helpful in 
stimulating further analysis and a better understanding of the relationship 
between computability and physics.
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